

The Coattail Effect in Multiparty Presidential Elections

Evidence from Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Many studies have been conducted about the presidential coattail effect in presidential democracies, but few have considered multiparty presidential elections. These few studies find that the effect does exist in multiparty presidential elections but their effect is unevenly distributed among the members of the party coalitions that nominate the presidential candidate. We follow these theoretical insights by presenting the case of Indonesia, the world's largest multiparty presidential democracy. Using election result data and national survey data, including experimental surveys, we find that in Indonesia the size and direction of the presidential coattail effect depend on whether the party is a core or peripheral member of the coalition, its role in the coalition, and its size.

KEYWORDS: coattail effect, multiparty election, party size, core member, peripheral member

1. INTRODUCTION

Many studies have been conducted about the coattail effect in presidential systems. In general, they have focused on the correlation between the presidential election and the legislative party system (Campbell and Sumners 1990; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003; Neto and Cox 1997; Rogers 2019; Samuels 2000; Stoll 2015). There are two main findings so far. First, the effect is an important connecting variable.

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It affects the shape of the party system, because the presidential candidate of a certain party affects the voters' choice of that party in the legislative election. Second, the findings suggest that the number of presidential candidates and the interval between the presidential election and the legislative election determine whether the presidential election increases or decreases the fragmentation of the party system. When the presidential candidates are few and the two elections are held concurrently or close together, the presidential election can reduce the fragmentation of the legislative party system (Clark and Golder 2006; Elgie et al. 2014; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011, 2013; Stoll 2015). When the presidential candidates are many, however, the effect will be to increase the fragmentation of the legislative party system (Elgie et al. 2014; Stoll 2015).

These findings have two implications. First, the coattail effect has to be present in order for the presidential election to have an effect on the political party of the presidential candidate. Second, for it to have a deflationary or inflationary effect on the legislative party system, a presidential coattail effect is not enough. It depends on other variables, such as the number of presidential candidates and the interval between the presidential election and the legislative election. In this article, our focus is on whether or not the coattail effect is present, with specific attention to how this variable works in the multiparty presidential election setting, using the case of Indonesia.

Many studies of the presidential coattail effect are based on both two-party and multiparty presidential systems; only a few focus on multiparty presidential elections. In the words of West and Spoon (2017, 578), "in most multiparty democracies presidential coattails are not so clearly identified."

In general, the coattail effect influences the fate of the president's party in the legislative election. In multiparty presidential elections, however, a candidate can be nominated by a coalition of parties, as in Indonesia. The question then becomes, how does the effect work in this setting? Does it affect only the presidential candidate's party? If not, how does it affect other parties in the coalition? Understanding these issues is important for several reasons. First, it can help us understand the different or similar strategies of presidential candidates and political parties in the formation of coalitions, both for elections and for governing, as the coattail effect might influence their choices. Second, if this variable works differently in a multiparty setting, we can ask further what the difference is. Third, more broadly, the presence or absence of the effect will be useful for further research on the

relationship between presidential elections and multiparty systems in general.

Several studies have investigated how the effect works in multiparty presidential elections or coalitional presidentialism. Among the most recent are West and Spoon (2017) and Borges and Turgeon (2019). West and Spoon find that the size of the party and its role in the coalition matter. Their findings suggest that smaller parties will have positive and larger presidential coattail effects when they have their own presidential candidates (sponsoring candidates) or when they are leading a coalition. This effect would decrease as the size of the party increases. Meanwhile, a party will reap a negligible benefit if its role is only as a member. Borges and Turgeon, in their analysis of the effect in Brazil and Chile, find what they call a “diffused coattail effect” which benefits both the presidential candidate’s party as well as members of the presidential election coalition (PEC). Their findings also suggest that the effect is unevenly distributed, benefiting only the core and not the peripheral members.

These two studies are both similar and different in their findings. Both confirm that there is a presidential coattail effect at work in multiparty or coalitional presidential elections, just as in two-party presidential elections. Both studies also confirm that only certain members of the coalition benefit, depending on factors such as their size and their roles or positions within the coalition. West and Spoon, however, clearly imply that only small parties will benefit, while larger parties will not. Borges and Turgeon find that core members of the coalition (including the presidential candidate’s party) will benefit, while peripheral members will not. Another difference is that West and Spoon’s cases were from in European and Latin American countries, which also included semi-presidential systems, while Borges and Turgeon’s cases were all from pure presidential systems.

In this article, we examine the case of Indonesia following the two studies mentioned above. In April 2019, Indonesia, the largest multiparty presidential democracy in the world, conducted concurrent presidential and legislative elections for the first time. Before that, in 2004, 2009, and 2014, presidential elections were always held separately, after the legislative election. As a result, the legislative party system has always been fragmented: around eight to ten parties have managed to win seats in the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council, DPR).

In Indonesia, the debate about whether the presidential election should be held concurrently with the legislative election has been mostly conducted

under the guise of “strengthening the presidential system”—that is, reducing the fragmentation of the legislative party system to ensure that the elected president will always have enough partisan support in the national parliament to govern effectively. One way to do that is to have concurrent elections, which could make the presidential coattails affect the support of the political party (or parties) that nominate the candidate. In this effort, in January 2013, several groups of election activists and political and communication scientists appealed to the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) to change the law on presidential and legislative elections to provide for concurrent elections.¹ They believe that this will enable a presidential coattail effect, which will influence the political parties nominating the presidential candidate.

In early 2014, the Constitutional Court agreed, ruling that to get the benefit of the presidential coattail effect (among other reasons), which would strengthen the country’s presidential system, the presidential and legislative elections must be conducted concurrently, starting in 2019. There was therefore high anticipation among the public, political analysts, democratic election activists, and political party leaders that the coattail effect would benefit the political parties of the winning presidential candidate, as well as the members of his coalition, after the 2019 election.

Yet the 2019 legislative election brought only a slight increase in support for the presidential winner’s party and several members of his coalition. The winning party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDIP), earned only around 19%, almost the same as in the previous election, even though the elected president is a party cadre. Nor were the other political parties’ vote shares very different from 2014. Some election monitoring groups took this as a sign that there was no presidential coattail effect in the elections.² In other words, there is an important research question as to whether or not there was a coattail effect in this first concurrent presidential and legislative election.

1. One of the groups was led by Effendi Ghazaly, a professor in the Communications Department of the University of Indonesia. His group’s reasons for demanding change were that concurrent elections would be more efficient (less expensive) and that the system would benefit from the presidential coattail effect (see the court’s ruling No. 14/PUU-XI/2013).

2. For example, a member of the Association for Election and Democracy (Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi) said in an interview with a journalist that the coattail effect was not present in the 2019 election because the support of the parties for the presidential winner did not change much (Bernie (2020)).

To date, there has been no systematic analysis on this topic in Indonesia. The sole related analysis we can find is from Nurhasim (2019), a political researcher at the Indonesian Sciences Institute (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia). His focus, however, was on the institutional variables affecting the 2019 elections, not whether a presidential coattail effect was present or how it affected the fate of political parties in the coalition which nominated the presidential candidate.

In this article, using election result data at the national and electoral district level, as well as national survey data, including experimental surveys, we argue that the effect was present in the 2019 Indonesian election. We also argue that in Indonesia the effect influences the members of the party coalition differently depending on whether each party is the presidential candidate's party, its role in the coalition, its ideological or policy distance from the presidential candidate's party, and its size.

2. THE COATTAIL EFFECT AND MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Most research on the presidential coattail effect does not distinguish between two-party or multiparty (coalitional) presidentialism. In both systems, the effect works because the presidential office is the most important one (Elgie et al. 2014; Ferejohn and Calvert 1984; Kernell 1977; Lago, Lobo, and Lago-Peñas 2016; Mondak 1993). The presidential election thus becomes the focus of electoral competition. The coattail effect runs from the more important to the less important offices (Samuels 2000). The voters will be using the same criteria in choosing a presidential candidate as in the competition for lower offices (the legislature). As a consequence, in the legislative election voters will strategically abandon political parties which are considered non-competitive or non-viable in the presidential election (Lago, Lobo, and Lago-Peñas 2016). This mechanism works particularly well when the legislative election is held close to or concurrently with the presidential election (Jones 1994; Samuels and Shugart 2003; Shugart 1995). In short, most research suggests that the effect is straightforward: support for a presidential candidate will be transferred to the political party that nominates them (Ferejohn and Calvert 1984; Mattei and Glasgow 2005). Thus, the coattail effect determines the fate of the party of the presidential candidate.

In multiparty presidential elections, a presidential candidate can be nominated by one political party or by a coalition of parties. The main relevant

finding from the research so far is that the presidential coattail effect can exist in both two-party and multiparty presidential elections. When a candidate is nominated by one party or a coalition, it can be hypothesized that the coattail effect applies to the political party or parties in the legislative election. Just how this effect relates to all members or each member of the coalition is still rarely investigated, however. The result of the effect is no longer straightforward (West and Spoon 2017).

In their analysis of factors that determine political parties' strategies in multiparty presidential elections, West and Spoon (2017) focused on party size, defined as a party's vote share in the previous election. In earlier research, West and Spoon (2013) found that party size affects a party's decision to enter the presidential race: large parties are motivated to win, while small parties want to increase their credibility. They believe that party size is one important variable to understand how the coattail effect works when a candidate is nominated by a coalition of parties. Their findings suggest that small parties (less than 10% of the votes) will get the most benefit when they nominate or sponsor a presidential candidate. Small parties that compete only as coalition members receive almost no benefit.

According to West and Spoon (2017), the process that links the coattail effect with the political parties competing in the legislative election is as follows. First, by default small parties are not in a good position to win the presidential election. This means that they have other goals in entering the presidential race, for example to increase their standing with the voters or to convince other parties that they can be viable coalition partners in the future. For a small party, sponsoring or nominating a presidential candidate will bring national attention, along with advertising its platform and ideology to a larger public. This translates into a better chance to gain support in the legislative election. Thus, the small party is more likely to benefit from the coattail effect from its presidential candidate. Large parties (10% or more of the vote) are already in a good position to win the presidency, and that becomes their main goal. But large parties are widely known to the voters. Sponsoring or nominating a candidate will not give them more support in the legislative election. Therefore, the larger the party, the less they will benefit from the coattail effect.

Second, when joining a presidential coalition, a small party might be ignored or abandoned by voters considering its scant influence or non-viable position in the coalition (Bargsted and Kedar 2009). But according

to West and Spoon (2017, 581), when small parties lead a coalition, “they encourage voters to remain loyal to them by signaling that they are attempting to capture more electoral support.” It also assures voters that the small party aims to play a more substantive or policy role in the coming administration. This makes voters more likely to consider them in the legislative election. So, small parties will get more of a coattail benefit when they have a leading role in the coalition.

Third, when parties, both small and large, only become members or joiners, their roles will not be visible to voters, because the focus of attention (including media coverage) will be on the presidential election. Therefore, the joiners will not get a meaningful coattail benefit, regardless of their size.

Meanwhile, in Borges and Turgeon’s (2019) research, the coattail benefit is unevenly distributed among the members of the PEC, which in turn affects their fate in the legislative election. Several factors determine the amount of benefit each party will get. First, large parties with a viable presidential candidate in a multiparty presidential system tend to form a coalition in their effort to win the presidency. Coalition is necessary given that in such presidential systems the party system tends to be fragmented, with a number of medium-sized parties. Because joining a coalition also means getting less attention from the voters, the founder or leader of a coalition needs to convince other parties they recruit that they will also get benefit from the coalition. One of the concessions they can make is to support the coalition members’ candidates in the legislative election or to assure them that they will not compete for the electoral bases of the coalition members. To do this, the coalition members need to coordinate their campaign efforts.

Second, coordination among coalition members is not always effective but depends on several factors. One is the ideological distance among parties in the coalition, particularly with respect to the coalition leader. Coordination will be more effective among parties that are ideologically closer to the presidential candidate’s party. When the ideological contrast is strong enough, coordination may alienate some voters. Another factor is the consistency of the strategies between the leader and coalition members. When a member has been in the same coalition since the previous one, voters can assess the consistency of the strategies of those parties. A coalition member that was part of the previous administration of the incumbent presidential candidate, for instance, can jointly claim credit, improving its chance to get more support.

Based on these two considerations, Borges and Turgeon distinguish between core and peripheral members of the coalition. Core members are the parties that are ideologically close to the presidential candidate's party and have been adopting consistent strategies (as members of the same coalition) since the previous election/government. The other members are peripheral. Borges and Turgeon's findings suggest that the presidential coattail effect is diffused, benefiting the presidential candidate's party and the core members of that coalition.

In view of these theoretical considerations, we can expect to find the following in the Indonesian case. First, that the coattail effect was present in the 2019 national elections. Second, based on West and Spoon (2013, 2017) and Borges and Turgeon (2019), that it affects the vote share of political parties in legislative elections unequally. Third, following West and Spoon, that none of the smaller parties (without sponsoring or nominating roles) get the benefit. Fourth, one small party (but just below 10%), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), entered a coalition with PDIP as the leader. As it happened, a prominent PKB figure became the running mate of the PDIP's presidential candidate. Based on West and Spoon's findings, we expect that PKB would enjoy the coattail benefit too. Fifth, following Borges and Turgeon, we expect that in the 2019 election the coattail effect benefited the presidential and vice-presidential candidates' parties and other parties regarded as core members of the coalition.

3. THE 2019 INDONESIAN ELECTIONS IN BRIEF

Indonesia started to implement presidential democracy in 2004 by conducting both multiparty legislative and presidential elections. Both are conducted every five years. Hanan (2012) categorizes the system as coalitional presidentialism, where a multiparty coalition plays a major role in both electoral and governing arenas (Altman 2001; Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2014; Kim 2008; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Raille, Pereira, and Power 2011).

In 2004, 2009, and 2014, the presidential election was conducted after the legislative election using a two-round (runoff) system. A presidential candidate can be nominated only by a political party or coalition of parties that controls at least 15% (2004) or 20% (since 2009) of the seats in the national parliament. If the winner of the election does not get more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election is conducted between the top two winners of the first

round. Since 2004, the presidential candidates have always been nominated by coalition of parties. The members of the DPR and local parliaments (at the levels of province and district/municipality) are elected using proportional representation. Until 2014, the legislative election was always held in early April, three months before the presidential election.

It is possible that neither West and Spoon's (2017) nor Borges and Turgeon's (2019) findings apply to the PEC system in Indonesia. First, ideological distance is not very clear. According to Fossati et al. (2020), Indonesian political parties have similar economic policy positions, but differ widely on religious issues. This is in line with the categorization of Indonesian parties by Aspinall et al. (2018) and Ufen (2008a, 2008b) into secular and religious parties. Therefore, to categorize members of a coalition into core and peripheral members, we can use their positions on religious issues.

Second, joining a presidential coalition in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election was not optional. Per the election law, for the presidential election, political parties must nominate a candidate or join a PEC. If they refuse, they will be banned from contesting in the next election. But a presidential candidate can only be nominated by a party or a combination of parties which has at least 20% of the seats in the national parliament. This is called the presidential threshold. Before 2019, no party had enough seats to nominate its own presidential candidate. Moreover, there were only two presidential candidates who ran in that election, so several parties had no option but to join one of the available PECs, even if they did so hesitantly or reluctantly. The implication is that there would be difficulty in coordinating inside the coalition, as suggested by Borges and Turgeon or West and Spoon.

Third, there is no formal institutional mechanism to require a coordinated campaign effort inside a PEC in Indonesia. This is in stark contrast from the electoral laws in Brazil and Chile, where Borges and Turgeon conducted their research. In those countries, there is a joint party list mechanism in which seats are allocated according to the vote share of all coalition parties summed together. This mechanism allows small parties to get seat allocations by joining in a coalition with larger parties, making it an effective mechanism of coordination within a presidential coalition. Lacking such a mechanism, coordination within an Indonesian presidential coalition depends very much on the informal negotiations between a leader and the members of the coalition. Otherwise, parties will be on their own in determining their fate in the legislative election. Because coordination is crucial, receiving the

benefits of the presidential coattail effect in Indonesia will probably depend on each of the parties' individual efforts.

The 2019 Indonesian general election featured head-to-head competition between two pairs of presidential candidates: Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin (Jokowi-Amin) on one side and Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno (Prabowo-Sandi) on the other. This election was a rematch of the 2014 election, because the presidential candidates were the same (though both running mates were different).

Before entering politics, Jokowi was an entrepreneur in the small city of Solo, in Central Java. Because of his good local reputation, PDIP successfully nominated him as mayor of Solo in 2005; he was re-elected in 2010 (Bland 2020). His humble, corruption-free, down-to-earth style of leadership made his popularity rise to the national level. He became governor of Jakarta in 2012, and in 2014, was successfully nominated by PDIP as its presidential candidate. The chairman of PDIP is Megawati Soekarnoputri (Megawati), a former Indonesian president and still the main decision-maker in her party. She was very likely at the time planning to run herself, but the polls found her to be less popular than Jokowi. The possibility that Jokowi would boost PDIP's support seemed to be an important factor in Megawati's nominating him in 2014, and again in 2019.

Meanwhile, Prabowo is a member of the political elite in the country. He was the son in law of Soeharto (the former authoritarian leader), a military general, and a big businessman. In his effort to become a presidential candidate, he founded Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, the Greater Indonesia Movement Party) in 2008 and successfully ran in the 2009 legislative election. In 2009 Prabowo ran in the presidential election as the running mate of Megawati. They were defeated by the incumbent president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 2014 Prabowo ran for president against Jokowi and was defeated again. His running mate in 2019, Sandi, was one of the party's Central Board members and a big businessman.

There were 16 parties contesting in the legislative election. Four were new parties: Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (Indonesian Solidarity Party, PSI), Indonesia Unity Party (Persatuan Indonesia, Perindo), Partai Berkarya (Working Party), and Indonesian Movement for Change Party (Garuda). Ten political parties formed a PEC called the Onward Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju, KIM): PDIP, Golkar Party (Partai Golongan Karya), PKB, Nasdem (Partai Nasdem, National Democrat Party),

Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party, Hanura), Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Justice and Unity of Indonesia Party, PKPI), PSI, Perindo, and Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party, PBB). This PEC had 63.7% of the total vote share of parties in the 2014 election (excluding the new parties).

On the other side, five political parties formed a PEC called the Just and Prosperous Coalition (Koalisi Adil Makmur, KAM), nominating Prabowo as their presidential candidate and Sandi as his running mate: Gerindra, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party, PD), and Partai Berkarya.³ The total vote share of parties in this coalition (excluding new parties) in the previous election was 36.3%.

In our discussion of core and peripheral members, we focus on Jokowi's coalition because he won the election. Following West and Spoon (2017) and Borges and Turgeon (2019), the roles or types of membership in Jokowi's coalition are as follows. PKB can be categorized as a sponsoring party, because Jokowi's running mate was a party member. Regarding religious issues, we use the Political Islam Index (PII) from Fossati (2019) and Fossati et al. (2020).⁴ Based on this index, we categorize Golkar, Nasdem, and Hanura as closer to PDIP than to PKB and PPP. There is no PII information on other political parties in this coalition, but because of its Islamic orientation, we can categorize PBB as not close to PDIP. Meanwhile, because of their non-religious orientation, we can categorize PKPI, PSI, and Perindo as closer to PDIP.

In terms of strategy consistency, except for new parties and PBB, all other members of Jokowi's coalition had been on Jokowi's side since 2014. However, two parties, Golkar and PPP, were not part of Jokowi's 2014 PEC. These two parties joined Jokowi's coalition only after the Jokowi government

3. One new party, Garuda, did not support any candidate.

4. The PII is based on the position of political parties regarding whether or not (1) the government should prioritize Islam over other religions; (2) Islamic religious leaders should play a very important role in politics; (3) Indonesian regions should be allowed to implement *sharia* law at the local level; (4) *sharia* law should be implemented throughout Indonesia; (5) blasphemy against Islam should be punished more severely; (6) when voting in elections, it is very important to choose a Muslim leader; and (7) Islam should become Indonesia's only official religion. The higher the index, the closer the party is to political Islam. Based on this index, PDIP and Nasdem are the most secular, Islamic-based parties (PKS, PPP, PAN, and PKB) are the most religious, and Demokrat, Gerindra, and Golkar are in between.

was formed after the 2014 election. Meanwhile, PBB had been part of the opposition during Jokowi's first term. It only joined the PEC in the last minutes of the 2019 coalition formation process. The other political parties (PKPI, PSI, and Perindo) were not core members, because of their very small size (PKPI) or new-party status (PSI and Perindo).

This categorization gives us an understanding of who were the core and peripheral members of Jokowi's coalition. PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, PPP, and Hanura were the core, while others can be considered peripheral. The core members can also be put into two subgroups. PDIP, PKB, and Hanura had been part of Jokowi's coalition since the 2014 presidential election. Golkar and PPP were members of Jokowi's opponent's coalition in 2014. They joined Jokowi's coalition after his administration was formed. This categorization will be useful when we try to make sense of the significance of the presidential coattail effect for each of these parties, in the discussion section.

4. DATA AND METHOD

To answer the questions of whether or not there is a coattail effect in Indonesian multiparty presidential elections and how that effect runs through the parties in a presidential coalition, we use several data sources and data sets. First, we use 2014 and 2019 national-level elections data, publicly available on the website of the Indonesian Election Commission.

Second, we use data from national public opinion surveys conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC): five pre-election surveys (October 2013, $N = 1,220$; December 2017, $N = 1,059$; September 2018, $N = 1,074$; February 2019, $N = 2,479$; and April 5–9, 2019, $N = 2,285$) and one exit poll conducted by SMRC and Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute, LSI) on April 17, 2019 ($N = 2,688$). The population of the pre-election surveys was Indonesian nationally eligible voters (citizens who are at least 17 years of age or have been married) when the surveys were conducted. The population for the exit poll is all citizens who exercised their voting right on election day, April 17, 2019. Samples were randomly selected nationally using stratified multistage random sampling, and selected respondents were interviewed face to face by trained interviewers.

The sampling procedure is as follows. The population was stratified based on provinces and urban/rural categories, with the sample size for each stratum

allocated proportionally. Next, the sample in each stratum was selected using multistage random sampling. In pre-election surveys, this was done in four stages: the villages in each stratum were randomly selected; from each selected village, five neighborhoods were randomly selected; from each neighborhood, two households were randomly selected; and from each household, one eligible voter was randomly selected to be interviewed. Sampling for the exit poll was conducted in two stages: the polling stations/booths in each stratum were randomly selected; and at each polling station, one person exiting the polling station was selected based on randomly selected timing.

The experimental survey method was also used in the national surveys of October 2013 and December 2017 to test the effect of the presidential nomination on political party support. To do so, the sample was randomly divided into several groups (control and treatment groups). Each group was given a different question. The presidential nomination effect was tested by comparing the responses of the treatment and control groups.

Third, we also looked at the results of the 2019 presidential and legislative elections at the electoral district level. There were 80 national (DPR) legislative electoral districts in 2019. We looked at the correlation between the support for the presidential candidate and the members (political parties) of the PEC.

Our analysis begins by comparing the results of the 2019 and 2014 national elections. Here we can use the basis of party size in 2014 for those parties which competed again in 2019, that is 12 out of 16 political parties. There were four new parties in 2019, which means we do not have information about their size (that is, their vote share in the previous election). We conducted a three-step analysis to determine whether there was a presidential coattail effect. First, we looked at the correlation between the vote for the presidential candidates and for the parties belonging to their coalitions. We also looked at the percentage distribution of presidential candidates' vote from their coalition members. Second, we used experimental survey data to discover the direction of the correlation. Finally, we consider scatter plots of the correlation coefficients between the presidential election winner's vote and the vote of each political party at the electoral district level. From this final step we can see whether the presidential coattail effect significantly applies to each political party. This gives us an indication of its diffusion or distribution among the coalition members of the presidential candidates.


5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 The Indonesian Presidential Coattail Effect and Coalition Parties

In 2014, 12 political parties contested in the legislative election conducted three months before the presidential election. PDIP won with 19%, followed by Golkar with 14.8%, Gerindra with 11.8%, and Demokrat with 10.2%. Other parties got less than 10% (Figure 1). Five parties (PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura, and PKPI) then formed a coalition to nominate Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi-JK) for the presidency. The total vote for the parties in this coalition was 40.9%. The opposing coalition of seven parties (Gerindra, Golkar, Demokrat, PKS, PAN, PPP, and PBB) nominated Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo-Hatta) as presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The total vote for parties controlled by this coalition was 59.1%. In the presidential election of July 2014, Jokowi-JK were victorious with 53.2%, although the parties in their coalition controlled only 40.9% of the legislative votes.


In 2019, all the players from the 2014 legislative election contested again, together with four new parties (Perindo, PSI, Garuda, and Berkarya). Jokowi-Amin won with 55.5%, defeating Prabowo-Sandi with 44.5% (Figure 2). The winner of the legislative election was PDIP with 19.3%, followed by Gerindra with 12.6%, Golkar with 12.3%, and other parties with less than 10% each. The total vote share of the parties in Jokowi’s PEC was 62%, greater than the vote share of Jokowi as the presidential winner.

FIGURE 1. Results of the 2014 Elections (%): (a) Legislative Election; (b) Total Vote Share of Parties Supporting a Presidential Candidate; (c) Presidential Election



SOURCE: Indonesian Election Commission.

FIGURE 2. Results of the 2019 Elections (%): (a) Legislative Election Result; (b) Total Vote Share of Parties Supporting a Presidential Candidate; (c) Presidential Election



SOURCE: Indonesian Election Commission.
 NOTE: The Garuda party did not support any presidential candidate.

We compare the 2014 and 2019 results to see whether there is a change in the legislative parties' electoral support and how it compares to presidential support. In the 2019 legislative election, the vote shares of PDIP (the party of Jokowi) and Gerindra (the party of Prabowo) are not so different from 2014. Both parties enjoyed only a slight increase, less than 1%. Only two of the 2014 contestants improved by more than 1%: Nasdem by 2.3% and PKS by 1.4%. Several political parties suffered losses: Demokrat 2.4%, PPP 2%, and Hanura 3.8%. The new political parties got less than 3% each, and the total for all four was only 7.2%. In other words, if we compare the vote shares of the 2014 contestants with those of 2019, we see only a very small difference. There is also little difference between the vote shares of parties in Jokowi's PEC in 2019 (62%) and 2014 (63.7%). On the other side, the total vote share of parties in Prabowo's PEC was 36.3% in 2014 and 37.5% in 2019. The result of the presidential election of 2014 is also similar, in terms of vote share, to the presidential election of 2019.

These results raise a question as to whether there was a coattail effect in the 2019 presidential and legislative election. We next consider the association between the presidential candidates' and political parties' support (Table 1).

Using data from the exit poll for election day 2019 conducted by SMRC and LSI, we compare the distribution (cross-tabulation) of the support for presidential candidates to political parties and the support of political parties for presidential candidates. We find that 85% of Jokowi's voters voted for the

TABLE I. Party versus Presidential Choice

	<i>Percentage within row</i>		<i>Percentage within column</i>	
	<i>Jokowi-Amin</i>	<i>Prabowo-Sandi</i>	<i>Jokowi-Amin</i>	<i>Prabowo-Sandi</i>
Party				
PKB	74	26	13	6
Gerindra	12	88	3	25
PDIP	94	6	33	3
Golkar	62	38	14	10
NasDem	73	27	12	5
PKS	12	88	2	16
PPP	55	45	4	5
PAN	22	78	3	12
Demokrat	36	64	5	11
Others	68	32	12	7
Chi-squared / df / sig. / valid <i>N</i>		790.671 / 9 / .000 / 2,255		
Coalition				
Supporting Jokowi-Amin	76	24	85	33
Supporting Prabowo-Sandi	22	78	15	67
Chi-squared / df / sig. / valid <i>N</i>		639.968 / 1 / .000 / 2,255		

SOURCE: LSI and SMRC Exit Poll, April 17, 2019.

parties in Jokowi's PEC (33% for PDIP, 14% for Golkar, 13% for PKB, and 12% for Nasdem). Similarly, most of Prabowo's voters (67%) voted for parties in Prabowo's coalition. Comparing this to the distribution of political party voters to presidential candidates, we find that most of the voters for parties in Jokowi's PEC (76%) voted for Jokowi, and most of the voters for parties in Prabowo's PEC (78%) voted for Prabowo. The support for each presidential candidate is strongly associated with the support for political parties. A chi-squared test confirms this strong association.

To reiterate, the support for presidential candidates came mostly from the voters for the coalition of parties that nominated them as candidates, rather than the parties that did not nominate them. In an association like this, we do not know the direction of the relation. According to the presidential-coattails theory, the direction should be from presidential candidate to party support: the presidential candidate is the cause, and political party support the effect.

An experimental survey supports this analysis. A national survey was conducted by SMRC from December 7 to 13, 2017. This survey looked at the effect of prominent political figures or presidential candidates on political party support. Two experiments were conducted: one on the effect of a figure or presidential candidate on PDIP support; and the other on the effect of presidential candidate support on Golkar Party support.

In the first experiment, the survey respondents were randomly divided into three groups, each being given a different question. The questions were designed with the assumption that only PDIP was contesting the election:


- Control group: “Would you vote for PDIP or a candidate for the DPR from PDIP if the legislative election were conducted now?” (Yes/No)
- Treatment group 1: “Megawati Sukarnoputri is now the chair of PDIP. Would you vote for PDIP or a candidate from PDIP if the legislative election were conducted now?” (Yes/No)
- Treatment group 2: “Jokowi is a PDIP member and now president due to being nominated by PDIP. Would you vote for PDIP or a candidate from PDIP if the legislative election were conducted now?” (Yes/No)

The result of the first experiment is presented in Figure 3. We find that the vote for PDIP is higher when accompanied with the information “Jokowi is a PDIP member and now is president due to being nominated by PDIP” (treatment group 2), and the difference is statistically significant. The information about the candidacy of Megawati Sukarnoputri (treatment group 1) does not have a significant effect on PDIP’s vote.

In the second experiment, the respondents were divided randomly into four groups. Each group got a different question. All assumed that only Golkar was a contestant:

- Control group: “Would you vote for Golkar Party or a candidate for the DPR from Golkar Party if the legislative election were conducted today?” (Yes/No)
- Treatment group 1: “Idrus Marham is a member of Golkar Party. If Idrus Marham is nominated as a presidential candidate by Golkar Party for the 2019 presidential election, would you vote for Golkar Party or a candidate for the DPR from Golkar Party if the legislative election were conducted today?” (Yes/No)

FIGURE 3. Presidential Candidate Effect on PDIP (Experiment), with 95% Confidence Interval




SOURCE: SMRC.

- Treatment group 2: “Airlangga Hartarto is a member of Golkar Party. If Airlangga Hartarto is nominated as a presidential candidate from Golkar Party for the 2019 presidential election, would you vote for Golkar Party or a candidate for the DPR from Golkar Party if the legislative election were conducted today?” (Yes/No)
- Treatment group 3: “Jokowi is a member of PDIP. If Jokowi is nominated by Golkar Party as a presidential candidate for the 2019 presidential election, would you vote for Golkar Party or a candidate for the DPR from Golkar Party if the legislative election were conducted today?” (Yes/No)

In Figure 4, we find that the vote for Golkar Party is higher with the information about Jokowi (treatment group 3), and the difference is statistically significant. Statements about the candidacy of Idrus Marham (the secretary-general of Golkar) and Airlangga Hartarto (the chairman of Golkar) reduce Golkar’s vote.

These two experiments show that the presidential candidate does have an effect on a political party’s vote. The electoral support for a party with information about the presidential candidate of that party is significantly

FIGURE 4. Presidential Candidate Effect on Golkar Party (Experiment), with 95% Confidence Interval



SOURCE: SMRC.

different from the one without presidential candidate information. This effect can be positive or negative. The candidacy of Jokowi boosted the vote for the party that nominated him, compared to a situation where there was no information about the presidential candidate of that party.

The presidential coattail effect can actually be seen in the 2014 election as well. However, because the legislative election was conducted before the presidential election, we can only analyze this for the political party which announced its candidate before the legislative election. Megawati, the chairman of PDIP, announced Jokowi's nomination in March 2014, one month before the legislative election. Therefore, we can assume that the voters were sure enough that Jokowi would be the candidate when the presidential election was held.

In October 2013, SMRC conducted an experimental survey to see the effect of Jokowi on PDIP's support if the party nominated him. The questions for the experimental groups were:


- Control: If the 2014 legislative election were conducted now, which party would you vote for?

- Treatment 1: If PDIP nominates Jokowi as president, which party will you vote for in the 2014 legislative election?
- Treatment 2: If PDIP does not nominate Jokowi as president, which party will you vote for in the 2014 legislative election?

Jokowi’s candidacy affects PDIP’s support significantly (Figure 5). If PDIP nominates him, support for PDIP increases significantly, by 17.9%; if not, support decreases by 6.5%. In other words, PDIP, as the president’s party, has benefited from the coattail effect since the 2014 election. This is one reason why PDIP’s support increased from 14% in 2009 to 19% in 2014, and the party came out ahead in the legislative election. That the increase was smaller than projected by the experiment was because Jokowi’s support was decreasing over time. In SMRC’s surveys, it fell from 62.1% in December 2013 to 55.3% in March 2014.


Why then was the vote for the political parties that nominated Jokowi pretty much the same in 2019 as it was in 2014? One way to answer this is by looking at the dynamic of support for presidential candidates. Approaching the 2019 election, based on four national tracking surveys conducted by

FIGURE 5. Presidential Candidate Effect on PDIP (Experiment), with 95% Confidence Interval



SOURCE: SMRC.

FIGURE 6. Trends in Support for Jokowi, His Coalition Members, and PDIP Approaching the 2019 Election (Percentage and Odds)




SOURCE: SMRC.

SMRC from December 2017 to April 2019, the support for Jokowi tends to decrease over time (Figure 6), and this decrease is parallel with a decrease in support for the members of his coalition, and his own party (PDIP).

It was 64.1% in December 2017, 2.4 times Prabowo's 27.6%. This support ratio (odds) decreased to 2.0 in September 2018, 1.8 in February 2019, and 1.5 (56.8% versus 37%) one week before the election on April 17 (Figure 6 (c)). The trend was similar for the support ratio of parties. In December 2017 the support for parties supporting Jokowi was 56.5%, 2.5 times Prabowo's 22.4%. These odds continued to decrease, to 1.7 in April before the election. Similarly, the support for PDIP decreased over time, following the decrease of support for Jokowi (Figure 6 (d)). It was 27.6% in December 2017, then down to 21.9% before the election. As Jokowi's support in 2019 was only slightly higher than in 2014, it is logical to expect that the support for PDIP and other members of the coalition would be similar to 2014 as well. Moreover, PDIP got the largest coattail benefit in 2014 from Jokowi's candidacy. In other words, the presidential coattail effect on parties' support is shrinking as the support for the candidate is falling. Another reason is that there were more parties competing in 2019 (sixteen) than in 2014 (twelve). Together, the new parties got 7.2% of the votes in 2019, which could prevent other parties from gaining a greater share.

FIGURE 7. Support for Jokowi and Members of his Presidential Coalition, Scatter Plots Displayed Together




SOURCE: Indonesian Election Commission.
 NOTE: r is the Pearson correlation.

We now know that there is a presidential coattail effect on presidential coalition parties. But do we have any insight as to how this affects each political party? To investigate this, we turn to the electoral district level. There were 80 electoral districts in the 2019 national legislative election. Scatter plots of support for the presidential candidates versus support for each political party can help us see the relation between them. Figure 7 shows scatter plots of support for Jokowi versus the members of his PEC, while Figure 8 shows scatter plots of Jokowi’s support versus other political parties.

In Figure 7, we see that Jokowi’s support tends to be positively correlated with most of his PEC members (PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Perindo, Hanura, and PSI). But that support seems not to correlate with support for Golkar and

FIGURE 8. Support for Members of Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s Presidential Coalition, Scatter Plots Displayed Together



SOURCE: Indonesian Election Commission.
 NOTE: r is the Pearson correlation

PKPI. Moreover, it is negatively correlated with PPP and PBB. Thus, the presidential coattail effect varies across the members of the PEC. The test (also in Figure 7) of the correlation between presidential candidate support and party support in Jokowi’s PEC shows that the significant positive correlation is only with PDIP, PKB, and Nasdem, implying that these three members of Jokowi’s PEC are the ones that enjoyed the greatest coattail effect. There is also significant correlation with PPP and PBB, but the direction is negative. With the rest of the members of the PEC (Golkar, Perindo, Hanura, PSI, PKPI), the correlation is not significant. These parties clearly did not enjoy a presidential coattail effect.

The scatter plots of Figure 8 clearly show that Jokowi’s support is negatively correlated with the members of the opponent’s PEC. This implies that

the presidential coattail effect can help parties that support or nominate the presidential candidate or the members of the presidential candidate's coalition, but also hurt political parties supporting the rival candidate. The statistical correlations between Jokowi's support and the members of the opponent's coalition are all negative and significant.

5.2 Discussion

Our findings are consistent with the theories and empirical findings of other research on this topic. The presidential coattail effect is present in Indonesia's multiparty presidential and legislative elections. Like Borges and Turgeon (2019), we find that the effect differs among the members of the multiparty presidential coalition: the so-called diffuse coattail effect. Overall, our data analyses confirm the five theoretical expectations laid out in our theoretical section, with some notes we will discuss below.

We find that the coattail effect can have three different impacts on the members of the PEC: significantly positive, no effect, or significantly negative. All three are found in our analysis. Why were different parties affected differently?

In Jokowi's presidential coalition, there is significant positive correlation between presidential support and party support for PDIP, PKB, and Nasdem. Because PDIP is the presidential candidate's party, it is easy to understand why there is a coattail effect here. It confirms the comparative theory and findings that the coattail effect is beneficial for the party of the presidential candidate. Based on our criteria, adopted from Borges and Turgeon (2019), both PKB and Nasdem are core members of the presidential coalition. It is consistent with their hypothesis that the coattail effect helps core members.

West and Spoon (2017) also help explain why PKB's vote correlates significantly and positively with support for Jokowi. PKB is a small party (less than 10% when entering the PEC), but its party figure, Ma'ruf Amin, was on the ballot as Jokowi's running mate. In other words, although PKB was small, it played a sponsoring role in Jokowi's coalition. As expected by West and Spoon, a small party with a sponsoring role benefits from the coattail effect.

Golkar, Hanura, PKPI, PSI, and Perindo's support show no significant correlation with Jokowi's support. All can be considered core members of Jokowi's PEC, so it is puzzling that they did not benefit from the coattail

effect as predicted by Borges and Turgeon (2019). Golkar's status must be qualified. Although it had been part of Jokowi's governing coalition since 2014, Golkar joined Jokowi's opponent's coalition in the 2014 presidential election. We can assume that voters had difficulty associating this party with Jokowi as the presidential candidate. Moreover, when we look at the distribution of Golkar's voters between the two presidential candidates, the 62% of Golkar voters who voted for Jokowi was much less than PDIP's 94%, Nasdem's 73%, and PKB's 74%. With less than 4%, Hanura, PKPI, PSI, and Perindo are small parties without a leading or sponsoring role, and are therefore not likely to get a coattail benefit, as argued by West and Spoon (2017).

The two Islamic parties, PPP and PBB, suffered from a negative coattail effect for two reasons. First, both parties are peripheral members of Jokowi's coalition. Both are Islamic parties, located at the opposite pole of the ideological spectrum (in terms of religious issues) from Jokowi's PDIP. Both were also part of Jokowi's opponent's coalition in 2014. Furthermore, both are small and did not play a leading or sponsoring role in Jokowi's coalition.

To reiterate, based on the analysis above, the findings on the presidential coattail effect in Indonesia are as follows. First, the winning candidate boosts the support for parties in their PEC in general (total votes). Second, this effect is experienced unequally by the various members of the coalition. Third, the coattail effect boosts support for the candidate's party (the coalition leader). Fourth, the core members of the coalition (measured by ideological closeness and strategy consistency) also benefit. Fifth, small parties with leading or sponsoring roles (such as nominating the running mate) also benefit. Sixth, small and new parties whose only role is as joiners do not get a significant benefit. And seventh, the peripheral members of the coalition, particularly those ideologically far from the coalition leader, are hindered rather than boosted.

Finally, although this is not our focus in this article, the fact that there is no deflationary effect is also a puzzle that calls for further investigation. For now, we can suggest two possible explanations. First, Lago, Lobo, and Lago-Peñas (2016) suggest that the presidential coattail effect is weakened after the founding election. Starting with the second election, there will be greater dispersion of voters across parties, which means that the number of parties will not decrease. In Indonesia, presidential and legislative elections have been conducted since 2004. Until 2014, both elections were not held concurrently, but they were only three months apart. Second, as suggested by Borges and

Turgeon (2019), coordination among parties in the PEC is important for the coattail effect to manifest for all parties in a multiparty presidential election. In Brazil and Chile, where they conducted their research, there is a formal institutional mechanism for coordination among parties on how to run a legislative campaign among parties in a PEC. This institutional coordination is absent from the Indonesian case. Lack of coordination in Indonesia led to a greater dispersion of voters across parties and no deflationary effect.

6. CONCLUSION

As the largest multiparty presidential democracy in the world, Indonesia is fertile ground for research on the correlation between presidential elections and the legislative party system. One important topic in this area is the presidential coattail effect. It is made more important because research that focuses specifically on how that effect works in a multiparty setting is still rare.

Using election data at the national and electoral district levels, combined with experimental and non-experimental survey data, we find that a presidential coattail effect does exist in the 2019 Indonesian multiparty presidential and legislative elections. We also confirm findings from other multiparty election settings which suggest that the effect is uneven. It benefits the presidential candidate's party, and some members of the PEC. However, other members of the coalition seem to enjoy no significant effect; some were even hurt rather than helped.

Our analysis suggests that the magnitude and direction of the effect depend on several factors, including whether the party is the presidential candidate's party; its role in the coalition (leading or sponsoring); its ideological or policy distance from the presidential candidate's party; and its size. Further research on this topic (both in Indonesia and comparatively) is still needed, including on whether or not the presidential coattail effect can have a deflationary or inflationary influence on the legislative party system.

Published online: March 7, 2022

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