Although primarily economic in nature, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often perceived as an economic instrument aimed at enhancing China’s geopolitical objectives. Despite the evident deployment of China’s geoeconomic strategy through the BRI, why does Indonesia continue to engage with the BRI? This paper aims to advance the discussion by shifting focus toward the implications of the BRI on the domestic political dynamics of Southeast Asian countries. It argues that Indonesia’s inability to perceive the BRI as a Chinese geoeconomic strategy stems from the initiative’s capacity to forge a new kind of regionalism. This new regionalism is characterized by the creation of network power, which strategically aligns local oligarchies and conglomerates with Chinese geopolitical interests. In a country like Indonesia, with deeply embedded patronage relations, such co-optation is an effective way to influence the decision-making process. In light of this, this paper conceptualizes the notion of patronage embeddedness to elucidate how Chinese foreign capital embeds itself within local political and economic networks to secure its interests through existing patronage relationships. Through this notion, our conceptualization not only shifts the narrative from a one-sided portrayal of Chinese agency but also highlights a dual agency scenario where Chinese capital and local oligarchs engage in a mutually beneficial relationship. Although this relationship offers advantages to both parties, it does not necessarily align with the broader interests of the Indonesian populace.