This paper examines Indonesia’s asymmetric exposure to maritime chokepoint disruptions across three channels: inbound shipping friction, strategic import dependency, and export-side terms-of-trade effects. Updating the Verschuur et al. (2025) country-by-chokepoint framework to a 2025 Indonesian baseline, it finds a sharp divergence at the Strait of Hormuz, where expected trade-at-risk is only US$16 million, yet Saudi Arabia accounts for 19.8% of crude imports (20.5% including UAE) and Hormuz-exposed LPG reaches 37.1% of total imports. In contrast, expected trade-at-risk is highest at Bab el-Mandeb (US$2.08bn; 0.144% of GDP), the Taiwan Strait (US$2.00bn; 0.138%), and the Suez Canal (US$1.47bn; 0.102%), while Malacca and Taiwan dominate gross exposure at around US$127bn each. The paper also quantifies an export-side energy windfall, showing how rising global oil prices boost Indonesia’s coal, LNG, and palm oil exports, partially offsetting import-side vulnerabilities. Overall, it reframes Indonesia’s chokepoint exposure as an asymmetric risk profile, combining structural import dependence with terms-of-trade gains.